UK: FRC consultation - Guidance for Directors of Listed Companies on Going Concern and Financial Reporting

Listing Rule 9.8.6 requires listed companies incorporated in the UK to provide in their annual report "a statement made by the directors that the business is a going concern, together with supporting assumptions or qualifications as necessary, that has been prepared in accordance with Going Concern and Financial Reporting: Guidance for Directors of listed companies registered in the United Kingdom, published in November 1994".

The 1994 Guidance is now the subject of review: the Financial Reporting Council has published a consultation paper in which it states:

The Guidance for Directors was written by a Working Group formed under the auspices of the Cadbury Committee that reported on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. The formation of the Working Group arose out of concerns that there had been several high‐profile company failures where there had been no apparent indication of the imminent problems in the previous year’s report and accounts.

The objective of the Guidance for Directors is to support good corporate reporting and, in particular, the requirements of the Listing Rules and Accounting Standards. When a company is not a going concern this does not necessarily mean that it is, or is likely to become, insolvent. The Guidance for Directors is not intended to address aspects of insolvency and, in particular, is not intended to support the requirements of the Insolvency Act 1986.

In the period since 1994 there have been substantial changes to the accounting standards applied by directors of listed companies. This is particularly the case for directors preparing consolidated accounts required to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) as adopted by the EU.

The FRC observes that current economic conditions are creating particular challenges for companies. Recent developments in global debt markets have led banks to be cautious of lending to one another (the so‐called “credit crunch”). This has severely restricted liquidity which has created unexpected financial difficulties for banks and entities that depend on the availability of loans as a key source of capital. Many market commentators are now forecasting a period of reduced growth and in some cases recession, with the result that going concern questions are likely to need to be considered in more detail by Boards of Directors.

In view of these deteriorating economic conditions the FRC has concluded that this is an appropriate time to consider whether the existing Guidance for Directors is necessary and remains appropriate, or whether it can be improved.

Note: The UK's Combined Code on Corporate Governance (June 2008) provides in Section C ("Accountability and Audit") the following provision (C.1.2): "The directors should report that the business is a going concern, with supporting assumptions or qualifications as necessary".

Postscript (2 Sep 2008): For further comment see this short article in the Financial Times newspaper. 

India: company law reform moves a step closer - Companies Bill 2008 approved by Cabinet

In 2005 the Irani Report, on the reform of India's company law, was published. Legislation to replace the Companies Act 1956 has been expected for some time. Its introduction has moved a step closer: today it was announced that the Companies Bill 2008 has been approved by the Union Cabinet and will be introduced in Parliament in October. 

The Government's announcement contains an overview of the purpose of the Bill: to provide the principles for the internal governance of companies and a framework for their regulation, administered by Central Government, but with a much greater role for shareholders.  Specific proposals include:

• The introduction of a new entity, the "one-person company".
  
• The abolition of shares with differential voting rights.
  
• Provision for the duties and liabilities of directors, with every company to have at least one director resident in India.
  
• At least one third of board directors to be independent [it's not yet clear to which companies this rule will apply; the Irani Committee proposed that is should apply to public listed companies and those taking deposits from the public]. 
  
• Insider trading by directors to be recognised as a criminal offence.
  
• Auditors' rights and duties to be explained.
  
• Class action suits by shareholder associations to be permitted.
  

UK: England and Wales: relieving directors from liability in respect of unlawfully paid dividends

In HMRC Commissioners v Holland (Ch.D., Deputy Judge Cawson QC, 24 June 2008) the judge had before him applications under Section 212 of the Insolvency Act (1986) relating to 42 separate companies. One of the questions considered was whether a director could be relieved from liability under Section 727 of the Companies Act (1985) in respect of the payment of unlawful dividends. In this regard, Deputy Judge Cawson QC observed:

"The headnote to Re Loquitur [Ltd., IRC v Richmond [2005] 2 BCLC 442] suggests that the case decides that there is no jurisdiction to grant relief under Section 727 CA 1985 where, as a result of directors failing to exercise proper skill and care a dividend is paid that renders the company insolvent or potentially insolvent. However, I consider  that this reads too much into Etherton J's judgment ... Whilst the Court will, necessarily, be most reluctant to grant relief under Section 727 when an officer/shareholder has benefited at the expense of the creditors by reason of the payment of the dividend, I consider that the Court does retain a discretion to relieve at least when, as in the present case, the director has not directly benefited from the payment of the dividend" (para. [224])

Notes: 

[1] The decision is not yet available on BAILII but a copy of the transcript is available on the Lawtel subscription service (the Lawtel staff have not yet prepared a summary). Update (29 Sept 2008): the decision is now on BAILII - click here. 

[2] The provision in Section 727 of the Companies Act (1985) permitting the court to grant relief is found in Section 1157 of the Companies Act (2006), which comes into force on 1 October 2008.

UK: directors' bonuses and gender differences

The UK's Financial Times newspaper has reported (online, 25 August), that "Female directors earn smaller performance-related bonuses than male counterparts, according to a new study that says the disparity reflects sexist attitudes. Researchers at Exeter university found that male executive directors in the best-performing companies were paid bonuses 263 per cent bigger than those working for the worst performers. For female directors the difference is a mere 4 per cent".

USA: California: directors' duties and corporate social responsibility

Section 309 of the California Corporations Code provides that a director must act in good faith, in the manner in which he/she believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. A proposal to amend Section 309 is currently before the California State Legislature. Assembly Bill 2944 , introduced by Assemblyman Mark Leno, will provide that in acting in the best interests of the corporation, the director may consider:

(1) The long-term and the short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders.

(2) The effects that the corporation’s actions may have in the short term or in the long term upon any of the following: 

• The prospects for potential growth, development, productivity, and profitability of the corporation.
  
• The economy of the state and the nation.
  
• The corporation’s employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors.
  
• Community and societal considerations.
  
• The environment. 
  

The draft Bill makes clear that the introduction of the above provision will not impose on the director any legal or equitable duties, obligations of liabilities, or create any right or cause of action against the director. According to Assemblyman Leno, the Bill "would promote socially responsible corporate conduct by authorizing boards of directors to consider the interest of the full community, the environment and employees, along with the interest of shareholders, when making official decisions on behalf of the corporation".  There has, quite predictably, been opposition. For example, the Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California has argued that the Bill would undermine director accountability to shareholders without effectively promoting interests of non-shareholder stakeholders.

Notes:

[1] Progress of the Bill can be monitored here and for an overview of the legislative process in California, click here. 

[2] Bill 2944 does not go as far as the UK Companies Act (2006) which, in Section 172, requires the director to act:

in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to: (a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company's employees, (c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company".

UK: directors' liability for the company's debts - a tax deductible expense?

In small, private companies it is not unusual for directors to guarantee company debts.  In A Guarantor v HMRC Commissioners [2008] UKSPC 00703 a company's directors guaranteed the company debts and did so as a condition of a factoring agreement which the company had entered at a time of financial difficulty. One director (hereafter 'the taxpayer') resigned from office but nevertheless became liable under the guarantee. He argued that his liability was a tax deductible expense. HMRC disagreed and the taxpayer appealed: the appeal was heard in July by Special Commissioner Colin Bishopp. 

The general rule concerning the deductibility of employees' expenses is found in Section 336(1) of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act (2003), which provides that a deduction is permitted if:

(a) the employee is obliged to incur and pay it as holder of the employment, and

(b) the amount is incurred wholly, exclusively and necessarily in the performance of the duties of the employment.

The taxpayer argued that conditions (a) and (b) were satisfied because he had a duty to maintain the company's solvency and, given that the company had exhausted all other possible sources of finance, his liability was incurred wholly and necessarily in the course of his employment. Special Commissioner Bishopp rejected the taxpayer's claim, agreeing with the majority of arguments advanced on behalf of HMRC including the fact that liability arose after the taxpayer's employment had ended (and was not, therefore, incurred in the performance of the employment). The Special Commissioner did, however, observe (at para. [12]): "Mr Smith's argument [on behalf of HMRC] that the payment is disqualified for relief because not every company director is obliged to give a personal guarantee for the company's debts may well overstate the position" (para. [12]). 

Belgium: corporate governance code - proposed changes

Belgium's Corporate Governance Committee has proposed several changes to the Belgian Corporate Governance Code. A consultation paper is available here (in Word format) and a draft of the new code is available here (also in Word format). The proposed changes address a wide range of areas including corporate social responsibility, the gender diversity of boards, board evaluation, directors' remuneration and the remuneration report. 

UK: PwC report on non-executive directors

PwC has published the 2008 edition of its annual report Non-Executive Director Practice and Fees, which is available for purchase from PwC (see here). A summary of the main findings has, however, been provided in a press release available here. Highlights from the report include (to quote directly from the press release):

Formal review of corporate governance and board effectiveness is becoming increasingly prevalent in UK companies, with 84% of respondents conducting annual performance reviews of their board. In addition, the average [non-executive] director’s time commitment has risen from 15 days in 2003 and 20 days in 2007 to 21 days in 2008.

Fee levels – fee levels continue to be influenced by both company size and time spent doing the job. The increase in fees for directors and chairmen is less pronounced than in previous years (an increase of 15.6% for directors and 25.0% for chairmen in 2008). 

Terms of appointment – there has been little change to policy regarding non-executive director appointments since last year. Most (78%) NEDs are appointed for an initial three-year term. 

Board structure – Analysis of the percentage of non-executives on the main board indicates that a 50/50 ratio of executive/non-executive is the median practice, although larger companies have a higher proportion of non-executives to executive directors (60/40 ratio).

Outside appointments – this year the survey showed a difference of market practice between smaller and larger organisations. In companies with revenues up to £500m, over half (51%) the companies have no executives serving on another companies’ board and are less likely to encourage executives to accept a non-executive appointment. Almost two thirds (62%) of companies with revenues over £500m have executives serving on other companies’ boards. The percentage was 52% and 59% in 2007".

Notes:

[1] The report is based on a survey of 155 companies and information in the most recently available annual reports of 1,500 quoted companies with year ends from September 2006 to February 2008.

[2] An overview of the 2007 report is available here.

UK: GC100 guidance on directors' duties

The GC100 - the Association for the General Counsel and Company Secretaries of FTSE 100 companies - has published further guidance on directors' duties under the Companies Act (2006), focusing on the provisions of the Act coming into force on 1 October 2008.

For further information see the following documents (all in MS Word format): Checklist for company secretaries | Briefing note on conflicts of interest | Questionnaire designed to identify conflicts of interest | Earlier guidance paper (January 2008) |

UK: England and Wales: CPR r 71.2 and the director of a corporate director

Part 71 of the Civil Procedure Rules contains rules which, to quote from Rule 71.1, "provide for a judgment debtor to be required to attend court to provide information, for the purpose of enabling a judgment creditor to enforce a judgment or order against him". Rule 71.2 provides that a judgment creditor may apply to the court for an order requiring an officer of a company or other corporation to attend court to provide information. Where that officer is a corporate director, does Rule 71.2 apply to the directors of the corporate director? It does not according to a unanimous Court of Appeal in Masri v Consolidated Contractors International Co SAL and others (No 4) [2008] EWCA Civ 876.

In the course of his judgment, Sir Anthony Clarke MR observed (para. [20]):

[It is argued] that, unless 'officer' is construed as including a director of a corporate director of the judgment debtor, companies will ensure that, so far as possible, they have corporate entities and not natural persons as directors. I very much doubt whether such a construction would be likely to have that effect. In any event, although I can see that it might be desirable for the rule to be widened to include such a case, I am not persuaded that 'officer' of the judgment debtor in the rule in its present form can properly be construed so as to include an officer of a corporate director of the judgment debtor".

Note: One of the changes being introduced by the Companies Act (2006) is the requirement that all companies must have at least one director who is a natural person (see Section 155, which is brought into force on 1 October 2008 by the Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No. 5, Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2007).

UK: England and Wales: unfair prejudice and directors' fiduciary duties

Interim post: Allegations concerning breaches of directors' fiduciary duties are often considered in the context of the unfair prejudice remedy (Section 994 of the Companies Act (2006), formerly Section 459 of the Companies Act (1985)). The recent High Court decision O'Donnell v Shanahan [2008] EWHC 1973 (Ch) provides a good example but the case is of particular interest because of the discussion of fiduciary duties. For example, the trial judge observes (at para. [212]):

Whilst the authorities make clear that, if a breach of the no conflict rule (and also the no-profit rule) is made out, it does not matter if the company (or trust or partnership) could not of itself have proceeded with the transaction, it does appear to me permissible to take into account when determining the scope of the directors' duties and in deciding whether 'there is a real sensible possibility of conflict' the inherent likelihood in fact of the company extending its existing scope of business into areas of business which might give rise to a conflict".

Notes:

[1] The judgment is not yet available on BAILII although it is available on Lawtel (for subscribers). The trial judge relied heavily upon the first instance decision Wilkinson v West Cost Capital & Ors [2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch). Update (28 August 2008): the decision is now available on BAILII - click here.

[2] The Companies Act (2006) has codified directors' fiduciary duties: see Part 10, Chapter 2 (and remember that the provisions within this Part have different implementation dates).  The O'Donnell case was concerned with the common law duties on which these codified duties are based. 

Directors' liability discharge proposals - report published

Manifest, in conjunction with Morley Fund Management, has published a report titled "Directors' liability discharge proposals: the implications for shareholders". The report, to quote directly from it: 

.... addresses what for many investors has been a largely obscure issue, namely proposals to discharge directors of liabilities that routinely appear on shareholder meetings’ agendas in many European markets. We look at 13 European markets that have resolutions of this type – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland; their legal basis and practical implications for shareholders in the voting context".

Isle of Man: the Company Officers Disqualification Bill 2008

Last year the Isle of Man's Financial Supervision Commission published a consultation paper proposing reforms to the law governing the disqualification of directors. A new Act is proposed which will bring together in one place all of the current grounds for disqualification. It will also introduce "disqualification undertakings" - agreements between the disqualified person and the Commission whereby that person acknowledges their unfit conduct and agrees certain restrictions with regard to the future involvement with companies. Following comments on a draft Bill a revised Company Officers Disqualification Bill 2008 has recently been published. 

For further information about other legislative changes, including amendments to companies law, click here. Information about the legal system on the Isle of Man is available here. Information about company law on the Isle of Man is available here.

UK: Supreme Court hears de facto director case

The Supreme Court begins hearing argument today in Holland v HMRC Commissioners: see here. The court will consider whether the director of a company which acted as a director of 42 companies was a de facto director of those 42 companies. The High Court ([2008] EWHC 2200 (Ch)) held that the director was a de facto director. The Court of Appeal ([2009] EWCA Civ 625) held that he was not.

UK: annual election of directors

Today's Financial Times newspaper reports, in an article titled Investors oppose annual board vote available here, that Hermes, Railpen and the Universities Superannuation Scheme have "written to 700 companies to encourage them to ignore new guidelines [in the UK Corporate Governance Code] that require the annual re-election of board members".

UK: women on the boards of listed companies

In response to a question asked yesterday in the House of Lords concerning women on public bodies and listed companies, Baronness Verma responded on the Government's behalf (Hansard, col 757 to 758):

... we have pledged to take action to promote gender equality on the boards of listed companies. However, we have more to do on the detail and in due course will be making an announcement setting out our future direction ... it is all about engaging with business and business organisations. We will engage with all relevant partners in developing our programme to fulfil the commitment in the coalition agreement. Head-hunters and recruitment companies will be aware of the stronger provision in the revised UK Corporate Governance Code, published on 28 May this year, on the importance of boardroom diversity ... we are working very hard to encourage people to work with us, rather than enforce an extra regulatory burden".

Elsewhere, the Guardian newspaper reports (see here):

The European Commission has warned companies that if they do not move voluntarily to ensure gender balance on executive boards, it will force them to. Fundamental rights commissioner Viviane Reding told the European Parliament: 'Equality in decision-making is not yet a fact ... I do not rule out the possibility of putting forward legislation in this area'.

According to her spokesman, Matthew Newman, the centre-right Luxembourgeois commissioner is giving companies a year to sort out imbalances. If they do not act, Brussels will consider legislation and other measures committing them to the sort of quotas that have recently been introduced in Spain and some German states".

UK: director disqualification orders in competition law cases

The Office of Fair Trading has published revised guidance on director disqualification orders in competition law cases: see here (pdf). The guidance sets out how, and when, the OFT will take action to disqualify directors where there is evidence that the director was responsible for, or ought to have known of, competition law breaches.

UK: the Manifest and MM&K executive remuneration survey

Today's Guardian newspaper reports - see here - the results of the latest remuneration survey conducted by MM&K and Manifest. According to the Guardian's report:

Chief executives of FTSE 100 companies have seen their remuneration rise by 5% to an average of £3.1m since 2008, while earnings per share fell by 1% over the same period ... Over the past 10 years chief executive remuneration has quadrupled while share prices have declined, suggesting little or no link between rewards, performance and shareholder value, according to MM&K and Manifest".

The full survey results are not available free of charge although MM&K have published a short overview, including a useful graph showing the composition of CEO pay over the past 10 years, here (pdf).

UK: England and Wales: derivative claims under the Companies Act (2006)

The High Court gave judgment today in Stainer v Lee & Ors [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch). Although only a first instance decision, it is nevertheless important because of the guidance it provides on the operation of the new statutory regime governing derivative claims under Chapter 1, Part 11, of the Companies Act (2006). There have been only a handful of reported cases so far and Stainer is of interest because permission to continue a derivative action was granted, subject to various conditions including one relating to costs. Two points of immediate interest are:

[1] Section 263 sets out the matters which the judge must consider in deciding whether to grant permission. In this regard, the trial judge observed (at para. [29]):

I consider that section 263(3) and (4) do not prescribe a particular standard of proof that has to be satisfied but rather require consideration of a range of factors to reach an overall view. In particular, under section 263(3)(b), as regards the hypothetical director acting in accordance with the section 172 duty, if the case seems very strong, it may be appropriate to continue it even if the likely level of recovery is not so large, since such a claim stands a good chance of provoking an early settlement or may indeed qualify for summary judgment. On the other hand, it may be in the interests of the Company to continue even a less strong case if the amount of potential recovery is very large".

[2] With regard to the claimant's costs, the trial judge observed (at para. [56]):

The Applicant seeks an indemnity for his costs, relying on Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 QB 373. I think that is clear authority that a shareholder who receives the sanction of the court to proceed with a derivative action should normally be indemnified as to his reasonable costs by the company for the benefit of which the action would accrue. But where the amount of likely recovery is presently uncertain, there is concern that his costs could become disproportionate. Accordingly, I place a ceiling on the costs for which I grant an indemnity for the future ...".

UK: corporate governance and AIM companies

Companies listed on AIM - the London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market - are not subject to the "comply or explain" regime of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance.  The LSE AIM Rules for Companies (2007) contain some provisions concerning the conduct of directors but these are not intended as a substitute for the Combined Code. The corporate governance practices of AIM companies have been explored in a recently published PwC report titled "Corporate Governance and AIM - An assessment of the governance procedures adopted by AIM companies". According to the report's executive summary:

...governance procedures adopted by AIM companies vary widely. It is apparent that good governance is not necessarily a function of size of the company or its location, and it is hard to argue that the bigger the company on AIM, the better the governance. This survey shows that the composition of the Board is a particular area of weakness for many AIM companies. The need for strong independent non-executive director representation on the board appears to be something many AIM companies have yet to recognise. Perhaps linked to this, is the fact that only a fifth of the AIM Top 100 reported that they had assessed their Board effectiveness. This fell to only 5% of the smallest AIM companies in our sample. It remains to be seen whether the current voluntary approach to governance is a sustainable model for AIM, especially when the evidence of this survey shows a relatively limited application of best governance practices, across all segments of the market".