UK: England and Wales: unfair prejudice and directors' fiduciary duties

Interim post: Allegations concerning breaches of directors' fiduciary duties are often considered in the context of the unfair prejudice remedy (Section 994 of the Companies Act (2006), formerly Section 459 of the Companies Act (1985)). The recent High Court decision O'Donnell v Shanahan [2008] EWHC 1973 (Ch) provides a good example but the case is of particular interest because of the discussion of fiduciary duties. For example, the trial judge observes (at para. [212]):

Whilst the authorities make clear that, if a breach of the no conflict rule (and also the no-profit rule) is made out, it does not matter if the company (or trust or partnership) could not of itself have proceeded with the transaction, it does appear to me permissible to take into account when determining the scope of the directors' duties and in deciding whether 'there is a real sensible possibility of conflict' the inherent likelihood in fact of the company extending its existing scope of business into areas of business which might give rise to a conflict".

Notes:

[1] The judgment is not yet available on BAILII although it is available on Lawtel (for subscribers). The trial judge relied heavily upon the first instance decision Wilkinson v West Cost Capital & Ors [2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch). Update (28 August 2008): the decision is now available on BAILII - click here.

[2] The Companies Act (2006) has codified directors' fiduciary duties: see Part 10, Chapter 2 (and remember that the provisions within this Part have different implementation dates).  The O'Donnell case was concerned with the common law duties on which these codified duties are based. 

UK: Scotland: unfair prejudice, implied terms and the affairs of the company

An interesting judgment was handed down yesterday by Lord Glennie in Scotland's Court of Session (Outer House). The case - Gowanbrae Properties Ltd., a petition of [2008] CSOH 106 - concerned a petition presented under Section 994 of the Companies Act (2006) (the unfair prejudice remedy, formerly Section 459 of the Companies Act (1985)). The case deserves attention because of Lord Glennie's comments on the width of the remedy and also because it provides a good illustration of the difficulties associated with determining whether prejudice has been suffered by a shareholder qua shareholder.

The petitioner held redeemable preference shares in the company. At the time that the preference shares were created, the company's articles were amended to provide for the redemption of the preference shares on a specified date: the day on which a certificate of practical completion was issued in respect of the development of a property owned by the company. The company's board decided not to proceed with the development of the property. The petitioner claimed that this prevented the redeeming of its shares and that this amounted to the conduct of the company's affairs in a manner unfairly prejudicial to its interests.

In order to bring their claim within Section 994, the petitioner argued that the directors' decision ended the basis on which the parties had entered into association; it was thus unfair, the petitioner argued, for it to be bound to continue as a shareholder in the company. Lord Glennie rejected this argument and the argument that a term should be implied requiring the company to achieve practical completion. His Lordship dismissed the petition and in the course of his judgment observed (at para. [20]):

If there is no obligation on the Company in terms of the implied term contended for by the petitioner, it must follow that the Company is free to make commercial decisions in its own interests. The directors owe a fiduciary duty to the Company and complaints can be made against them if, in breach of that duty, they have regard to extraneous matters, such as a desire to benefit some other company. The court will not lightly infer from surrounding circumstances the existence of an understanding to which the Company should be held in equity and which would prevent it from making decisions in its best interests..."

Lord Glennie also made the following interesting observations with regard to the petitioner's claim and the court's jurisdiction under Section 994 (at para. [22]):

The essence of that jurisdiction [Section 994] is that the affairs of the company have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the petitioner as a member of the company. The petitioner's claim, as was stressed repeatedly in argument, is based on the fact that it had an accrued right to payment ... It seems to me to be arguable that the prejudice which the petitioner has suffered, if it be prejudice, is as a seller of shares rather than as a member of the company. In response to this argument, I was referred on behalf of the petitioner to the case of Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic Partners Limited [2007] 4 All ER 164. In that case a shareholder claimed under the Jersey equivalent of section 459 on the basis that he was a creditor, and would not have advanced sums to the company but for having been a shareholder. This, it was argued, illustrated the width of the jurisdiction. Those facts are, of course, the reverse of the present circumstances ..."

Note: For an earlier decision of Lord Glennie considering Section 994, see: West Coast Capital (Lios) Ltd. [2008] CSOH 72.

USA: Delaware - Supreme Court opinion in CA Inc v AFSCME

The Delaware Supreme Court has given its opinion in CA Inc. v AFSCME Employees Pension Plan (No. 329, 2008). The opinion has been keenly anticipated because of the issues it raises about the management of companies and the role of the directors and shareholders.  AFSCME, a stockholder in CA Inc. ("the company"), submitted a bylaw for inclusion in the company's proxy materials for its 2008 annual stockholder meeting. The bylaw, if accepted, would require the board of directors to reimburse a stockholder (or group of stockholders) the reasonable expenses incurred in nominating one or more candidates in a contested election of the board of directors. 

The company's board decided to exclude the proposed bylaw from the proxy materials. The SEC was informed and a request was made for a "no action" letter (one indicating that enforcement action would not be taken against the company for its exclusion of the proposed bylaw). The company argued that the proposed bylaw was not a proper subject for a stockholder action and if implemented would breach Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The AFSCME obtained legal advice taking the opposition position. The SEC decided to ask the Delaware Supreme Court for its opinion - the first time it has done so under new clarification rules in the Delaware Constitution (Article IV, §11(8), about which see here) - and posed two questions.

The first question was whether the AFSCME proposal was a proper subject for action by shareholders under Delaware law. The court held that it was and observed:

The shareholders of a Delaware corporation have the right “to participate in selecting the contestants” for election to the board. The shareholders are entitled to facilitate the exercise of that right by proposing a bylaw that would encourage candidates other than board-sponsored nominees to stand for election. The Bylaw would accomplish that by committing the corporation to reimburse the election expenses of shareholders whose candidates are successfully elected. That the implementation of that proposal would require the expenditure of corporate funds will not, in and of itself, make such a bylaw an improper subject matter for shareholder action".

The second question for the court was whether the AFSCME Proposal, if adopted, would cause the company to violate any Delaware law to which it was subject. The court held that it would. In reaching this decision, the court considered the proposed bylaw in the abstract and stated that it had to consider:

... any possible circumstance under which a board of directors might be required to act. Under at least one such hypothetical, the board of directors would breach their fiduciary duties if they complied with the Bylaw. Accordingly, we conclude that the Bylaw, as drafted, would violate the prohibition, which our decisions have derived from Section 141(a), against contractual arrangements that commit the board of directors to a course of action that would preclude them from fully discharging their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders".

Unsurprisingly commentators have been quick to describe the decision as a further example of the director-centric nature of Delaware law but the court's opinion is rather more nuanced than this description suggests.  For further discussion see:

Harvard Corporate Governance blog | Wall Street Journal article | Professor Bainbridge's blog | Risk & Governance Blog | Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog (with links to other blog posts) | 

UK: England and Wales: directors' liability for inaction

The High Court has today given judgment in Lexi Holdings v Luqman & Anor [2008] EWHC 1639 (Ch). The case concerned allegations of breach of duty made against several directors. It was argued that the inaction of these directors - including their failure to disclose to the board information known to them - had caused the losses resulting from the misappropriation of the company's assets by the managing director. The trial judge (Briggs J.) rejected this argument because causation could not be established but he nevertheless made some interesting points with regard to directors' duties.  In evaluating the claims Briggs J. considered the duties of directors (under the law before the codification of directors' duties in the Companies Act (2006)) and held that that the standard of care expected of directors is assessed using a dual objective/subject test. In this regard, Briggs J. observed (paras. [37] and [38]):

The objective test sets the basic standard. It is no excuse for a director to say that, in fact, she did not have the general knowledge, skill or experience reasonably to be expected of a person carrying out her appointed functions. The subjective test potentially raises the standard by reference to any greater general knowledge, skill or experience which the particular director actually has. To that analysis may be added the principle, established for example in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Limited [1925] Ch 407 that, because of the essentially fiduciary nature of the office, a director is expected to apply to the management and custodianship of the company's property that same degree of care as she might reasonably be expected to apply in the management and custodianship of her own property".

Briggs J. then proceeded to consider the proper course of action for a director resigning from his/her position in circumstances where he/she is concerned about the conduct of the other directors.  The comments of Briggs J. in this regard are of particular interest because he recognised that resignation alone may not be a sufficient response (at para. [39]):

The fiduciary nature of the office also affects the question whether, and if so when, resignation may be an appropriate response by a director to circumstances coming to her attention. Prima facie a director who no longer wishes to perform her duties, or who finds it impossible to do so, may properly resign; see Re Galeforce Pleating Co Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 704, at 716 c-d. But a director who wishes to retire may nonetheless be required to take steps to deal before departure with a pressing matter calling for attention, or to put her continuing colleagues on the board in possession of information known to her relevant to the matter in question, so as to enable them to deal with it. Exceptionally, a director may upon departure be obliged to put relevant information in the hands of the company's shareholders or other stakeholders, if not satisfied that continuing colleagues on the board have the inclination or the ability to deal with a matter of concern".

Scotland: Directors' duties and unfair prejudice

The Court of Session has, today, declined to grant West Coast Capital (WCC) an interim interdict (injunction) which would have prevented Dobbies plc from proceeding with a rights issue.  WCC, a minority shareholder in Dobbies, presented a petition under Section 994 of the Companies Act (2006), alleging that the Dobbies directors (several of whom were officers or directors of Tesco plc and had been appointed last year when Tesco became a majority shareholder) had exercised their powers in Tesco's interests to the prejudice of the other shareholders and had failed to act fairly between Tesco and the other shareholders.  

Lord Glennie was not satisified that WCC had an arguable case.  His opinion is available here and it is important for several reasons:

[1] There is discussion of Section 171 and Section 172 of the Companies Act (2006).  Section 172 imposes a duty on company directors to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the shareholders as a whole.  In doing so, directors are required to have regard to various factors, including the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment and the need to act fairly as between members of the company.  In Lord Glennie's view, Section 172 does "little more than set out the pre-existing law on the subject" (para. [21]).  Some may question that interpretation because Section 172 sets out, for the first time in companies legislation, certain factors that directors are required to consider. 

[2] There is the clear recognition that breaches of directors' duties can be unfairly prejudicial.  This point remains controversial.  Lord Glennie nevertheless observes: "... it is important to have in mind that fairness and unfairness (in the context of assessing whether conduct is "unfairly prejudicial") are not abstract concepts. They are used in the context of a commercial relationship, where the parties' rights and expectations are governed by contract, namely the articles of association, and, possibly, by other agreements or understandings, as well as by the fiduciary duties which directors owe to the company" (para. [19]).

The case has attracted widespread attention in the media because of the parties involved. See, e.g., The Scotsman, The Guardian and The Times.

Postscript (21 May 2008): The Guardian has reported that West Coast Capital has agreed to accept an offer from Tesco of £12 per share.

Delaware: Corporate officers and fiduciary duties

In two recent Delaware decisions it has been accepted that corporate officers owe the same duties as directors: Midland Grange No. 27 Patrons of Husbandry v. Walls (28 Feb. 2008) and Miller v. McDonald (9 April 2008). For further discussion, see this post on the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog and an article by Lyman Johnson posted here on SSRN.

US: New York: The derivative action and LLCs

In 1994, New York State introduced a new legal form: the Limited Liability Company (LLC). The LLC is, to quote directly from the Guide produced by New York State's Division of Corporations:

"...an unincorporated business organization of one or more persons who have limited liability for the contractual obligations and other liabilities of the business. The Limited Liability Company Law governs the formation and operation of an LLC. An LLC may organize for any lawful business purpose or purposes. The LLC is a hybrid form that combines corporation-style limited liability with partnership-style flexibility. The flexible management structure allows owners to shape the LLC to meet the needs of the business. The owners of an LLC are "members" rather than shareholders or partners. A member may be an individual, a corporation, a partnership, another limited liability company, or any other legal entity".

The question before the New York State Court of Appeals in Tzolis v. Wolff, N.Y. Slip Op. No. 01260 (N.Y. February 14, 2008) was whether members of a LLC could bring a derivative action. The Limited Liability Company Law is silent on this issue. The majority in Tzolis held that a member could bring such an action, referring to early English and American cases; Smith J. observed (pp. 5-6):

"...we continue to heed the realization that influenced Chancellor Walworth in 1832 [in Robinson v Smith (3 Paige Ch 222)], and Lord Hardwicke ninety years earlier: When fiduciaries are faithless to their trust, the victims must not be left wholly without a remedy. As Lord Hardwicke put it, to 'determine that frauds of this kind are out of the reach of courts of law or equity' would lead to 'an intolerable grievance' (Charitable Corp. v Sutton, 2 Atk at 406 [(1742) 26 ER 642]). To hold that there is no remedy when corporate fiduciaries use corporate assets to enrich themselves was unacceptable in 1742 and in 1832, and it is still unacceptable today. Derivative suits are not the only possible remedy, but they are the one that has been recognized for most of two centuries, and to abolish them in the LLC context would be a radical step".

However, in a powerful dissent, Read J. observed (p. 20):

"The enacting (not a subsequent) Legislature considered and explicitly rejected language authorizing the very result that plaintiffs have successfully sought from the judiciary in this case. Fourteen years after the fact the majority has unwound the legislative bargain. The proponents of derivative rights for LLC members -- who were unable to muster a majority in the Senate -- have now obtained from the courts what they were unable to achieve democratically. Thanks to judicial fiat, LLC members now enjoy the right to bring a derivative suit. And because created by the courts, this right is unfettered by the prudential safeguards against abuse that the Legislature has adopted when opting to authorize this remedy in other contexts"

UK: Scotland: fiduciary duties and the non-executive director

The Court of Session (Inner House) has considered the scope of a non-executive director's fiduciary duties in Commonwealth Oil and Gas Co. Ltd. v Baxter [2009] CSIH 75. This is an important decision because there are few recent cases considering non-executive directors' duties. Their Lordships held that the non-executive director owed the same duties to the company as its executive directors. The decision will be of interest in England and other jurisdictions, not least because their Lordships discussed a broader conceptual question: are fiduciary duties proscriptive or prescriptive?

UK: Conflicts of interest and the Companies Act (2006)

Section 175 of the Companies Act (2006) codifies the fiduciary no-conflict rule with regard to company directors. It provides: "A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of the company". It comes into force on 1 October 2008 (for details of this and other implementation dates, click here).

GC100 - the Association of General Counsel and Company Secretaries of the FTSE100 - has published guidance on Section 175. The document identifies situations in which Section 175 is likely to be breached and provides guidance for company secretaries when dealing with directors' conflicts of interest. The guidance is available here.

Scotland: Non-executive directors' fiduciary duties

Shortly before Christmas, Lord Reed gave his opinion in Commonwealth Oil & Gas Company Ltd v Baxter & Anor [2007] ScotCS CSOH198. This important decision deserves attention in and beyond Scotland for several reasons:

(1) it is one of the most important Scottish company law decisions of recent years

(2) it sends a clear message that the holding of directorial office should not be assumed lightly

(3) Lord Reed states that non-executive directors are subject to the same fiduciary duties as executive directors.

Postscript (24 April 2008): It has been reported that Mr Baxter, the non-executive director whose actions were found in breach of fiduciary duty, is to appeal.